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Abstract 
 
Recently, in the field of causal inference, nonparametric techniques, that use 
matching procedures based for example on the propensity score 
(Rosenbaum, Rubin, 1983), have received growing attention. In this paper 
we focus on propensity score methods, introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983). The key result underlying this methodology is that, given the 
ignorability assumption, treatment assignment and the potential outcomes 
are independent given the propensity score. Much of the work on propensity 
score analysis has focused on the case where the treatment is binary, but in 
many cases of interest the treatment takes on more than two values. In this 
article we examine an extension to the propensity score method, in a setting 




Recently, in the field of causal inference, nonparametric techniques, that use 
matching procedures based for example on the propensity score 
(Rosenbaum, Rubin, 1983), have received growing attention. When the 
data, the type of intervention and the assignment criterion allow it, a quasi-
experimental design can be assumed such as the regression discontinuity 
design (Thwistelthwaite, Campbell, 1960; Battistin, Rettore, 2004). Another 
assumption, that leads to another quasi-experimental design and may be 
reasonable to assume in some observational studies, is that treatment 
assignment is unconfounded with potential outcomes conditional on a 
sufficient set of covariates or pretreatment variables. The unconfoundedness 
assumption allows us to compare treated and control units with the same 
value of the covariates. Given unconfoundedness, various methods have 
been proposed for estimating causal effects. In this paper we focus on 
propensity score methods, introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). The 
key result underlying this methodology is that, given the ignorability 
assumption, treatment assignment and the potential outcomes are 
independent given the propensity score. Thus, adjusting on the propensity 
score removes the bias associated with differences in the observed 
covariates in the treated and control groups. To estimate propensity scores, 
which are the conditional probabilities of being treated given a vector of 
observed covariates, we must specify the distribution of the treatment 
indicator given pre-treatment variables.  
 
  iv
Much of the work on propensity score analysis has focused on the case 
where the treatment is binary, but in many cases of interest the treatment 
takes on more than two values (for example, we can think to drug applied in 
different doses or a treatment applied over different time periods…etc). In 
this paper we examine an extension to the propensity score method, in a 
setting with a continuous treatment. The first section introduces the standard 
propensity score analysis (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) - that is when the 
treatment is binary. The second section is a review of the propensity score 
methodology with multiple treatment. The third section deals with the 
propensity score method when the treatment is continuous.   1
1   The evaluation of public policies: some 
statistical methods  
1.1  Introduction 
The  evaluation of policies carried out by using quantitative tools is a 
tangible answer to the need to express “ judgements empirically based on 
achievement accomplished by a  public policy when facing a particular 
collective problem”. By “ collective problem” we mean a situation that is 
socially perceived as inadequate and, as such, worthy of change and 
eventually worthy of public contribution. Think about pollution in city 
centres, assistance to old people or the lack of competitiveness between 
small and medium enterprises: these are all problems which require public 
involvement through allocation of  fund. When a problem is faced by an 
intervention, we are referring to a public  policy ( Martini  et al. 2005).  The 
statistic field of reference is that of causal inference, with the reference to 
and the development of appropriate quantitative methods for policy effect 
evaluation.  The starting point of a policy effect evaluation is the 
identification of the object of analysis, i.e., referring to the potential 
outcome approach to causal inference (Neyman, 1923; Rubin, 1974), a 
characteristic of the distribution of the difference between two potentially 
observable outcomes:  Y0 (a post-intervention variable observed on a unit  - 
individual or firm  - in the absence of an intervention) and  Y1 (a post-
intervention variable observed on a unit in the presence of an intervention). 
Identification and estimation of such parameters present some relevant 
problems: a) only one of the two potential outcomes is observed on a single   2
unit, the other representing the counterfactual situation; b) the assignment to 
the treatment is usually not random, so estimation is based on observational 
data; c) it is necessary to isolate the effect of the intervention from the 
effects of other factors, which can influence access and results. Appropriate 
estimation methods (parametric or nonparametric) should be based on 
sensible hypotheses about the assignment rule, which a llow to identify (even 
partially, Manski, 1995, 2003) the causal effects. In observational studies, a 
usual starting point consists in constructing a control group (units not 
receiving the treatment, but similar to units receiving it), under the 
unconfoundedness assumption (Rosenbaum, Rubin, 1983). In this section 
we intend to describe the basic principles of such an approach, continuing 
with a more formal discussion.  
1.2  Potential results and the Rubin Causal model 
The basic idea of  causal inference is that of an action (or a treatment) 
applied to a unit, where unit means a person or a company, at a specific 
point in time. As a result, in the binary treatment case, for each unit and 
each treatment there are two potential results: one referring to the value of 
the outcome variable in the event of treatment, and the other in the event of 
non treatment. The causal effect is the result of a comparison between the 
two potential results. The use of the adjective ‘potential’ is motivated by the 
impossibility of observing the outcome both with and without treatment. 
This is defined as the basic problem of causal inference (Holland, 1986). In 
this sense it is very useful to have information about several units, analysing 
the distribution of the treatment effect and c oncentrating on summary   3
measures of such distribution, for example the average treatment effects. In 
order to obtain correct estimates of such quantities, it is crucial to define the 
assignment mechanism, described below. We now introduce some notation: 
consider a population of  N units. Each unit  i is characterised by a  k-
dimensional vector of Xi covariates, two potential results Yi(0) and Y i(1)  and 
a variable Zi { } 1 , 0 ˛ , which denotes the assignment (Zi = 1) or not (Zi = 0) to 
the treatment.  X indicates the matrix (N · K) of the k units’ characteristics, 
Y(0)  and  Y(1)  the  vector of the potential  results and  Z the vector for 
assignment to treatment 1. 
From the existing tie between the vectors of potential results ( Y(0),  Y(1)) 
and treatments  (Z), we have two distinct relationships between the observed 
and unobserved results, denoted by Yi (observed) and Yi (missing) respectively: 
Yi (observed) = Zi￿ Y(1) + (1-Zi)￿ Yi(0) 
Yi (missing) = (1-Zi)￿ Y(1)  + Zi￿ Yi(0) 
where Yi (observed) and Yi (missing) represent the i.th element of vectors Yi (observed) 
and Y(missing). In order to identify and define causal effects, it is necessary to 
make some assumptions. An important assumption, that reduces the number 
of potential results is the following (Rubin, 1978a, 1980): 
Assumption 1.1  Stable  Unit  Treatment  Value  Assumption 
(SUTVA), under which the potential outcomes  Yi(Zi)  for the  ith unit 
just depend on the treatment that the ith unit received. That is, there 
is “no interference between units” and there are “no versions of 
treatments”.   4
It is necessary to emphasize how the reliability of such an assumption is 
neither testable, nor removable and completely based on the experience of 
the researcher. Identifying treatment effects relies on further assumption on 
the assignment mechanism, that is,  the mechanism that determines which 
units get which treatments, formally defined as follows: 
Definition 1.1  Assignment mechanism  
Given a population of  N units, the  assignment mechanism is a  row 
exchangeable function  p( ) 1 ( ), 0 ( , ; ( Y Y X Z ), with values included in 
{ }
N 1 , 0 and so that ￿ =
Z Y Y X Z p 1 )) 1 ( ), 0 ( , ; ( , for each  ) 1 ( ), 0 ( , Y Y X . 
The probability of unit assignment is defined as follows: 
Definition 1.2  Units assignment probability 
The probability of assignment to treatment for unit i is given by: 
)) 1 ( ), 0 ( , ; ( )) 1 ( ), 0 ( , ( 1 Y Y X Z p Y Y X p
i z i ￿ = =
z . 
Let X(i) indicates the matrix  (N-1) · K dimension obtained removing the i.th 
matrix row  X; and analogously for Y(i)(0) and Y(i)(1). The exchangeability of 
the assignment mechanism allows us to rewrite the N functions pi(.) in terms 
of a common function  q(.), that depends on the covariates and potential 
results of unit i and on the covariates and potential results of all other units.  
)) 1 ( ), 0 ( , ( Y Y X pi =  ) ) 1 ( , ) 0 ( , ), 1 ( ), 0 ( , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( i i i i i i Y Y X Y Y X q  
for any  i = 1,…N 
Strictly connected to the assignment probability concept there is the 
propensity score, defined as follows:   5
Definition 1.3  Propensity score. 
Given a population of N units, the propensity score is defined as: 
{ } ￿ = = ) / ) 1 ( ), 0 ( , ( )) 1 ( ), 0 ( , ( : x i x X i N Y Y X p Y Y X e
i  
with  x N  equal to the number of units with  x X i = . For each  x 
resulting in  x N  = 0, the propensity score is not defined. (Imbens, 
2002). 
This definition of the propensity score, which will be examined in detail in 
later sections, will be useful later on for analysing our case study, where the 
treatment turns out to be a continuous variable and a generalized propensity 
score is defined to allow for treatment effect estimation with no binary 
treatment. The definition of probabilistic assignment follows: 
Definition 1.4  Probabilistic assignment  
An assignment mechanism is referred to as probabilistic if for every i 
the assignment probability is between 0 and 1, that is: 
( ) 1 ) 1 ( ), 0 ( , 0 < < Y Y X pi   
This assumption requires that each unit has a non-zero probability of being 
treated and, at the same time, there are no units with a probability equal to 1 
of being treated.   6
1.3  Causal effects and identifying assumptions 
Inferences about  the effects of the treatments involve speculations about the 
effect that one treatment would have had on a unit which, actually, received 
an other treatment (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983a). If we consider the 
binary treatment, according to the type of intervention assigned to the  N 
units under study, the  i.th unit has both a response  Yi(1), that would have 
resulted if it had received treatment 1 and a response Yi(0) that would have 
resulted if it had received treatment 0. As a result, causal effects are 
comparison of  ) 0 ( ) 1 ( i i ,Y Y  (for example, a difference  ) 0 ( ) 1 ( i i Y Y -  or a ratio 
) 0 ( / ) 1 ( i i Y Y ). It is evident that estimating the causal effects of treatments is a 
missing data problem, since either  Yi(1) or Y i(0) is missing. In  causal 
inference in general  – and in  policy evaluation in particular – a quantity of 
primary interest to be estimated is the  average treatment effect ATE, 
defined as follows: 
ATE =  )] 0 ( [ )] 1 ( [ )] 0 ( ) 1 ( [ ] [ i i i i i Y E Y E Y Y E E - = - = t    
The estimation of the average treatment effect for a subpopulation (SATE) 
having received treatment level z - with z = 0,1 - is equal to: 
SATE =  [ ] z Z i E i T = = : t t  
and when z = 1 the SATE is usually known as the ATT. In particular, in the 
field of  policy evaluation, we are interested in the ATT estimation, because, 
with such an e stimate, it is possible to assess how much the intervention 
may have produced a change in a given condition or behaviour of the policy   7
beneficiaries. Now, in the case of randomized experiments, it has been 
shown  (Neyman, 1923) that the ATT can be easily e stimated; this means 
that it is possible to obtain an unbiased estimate of the average causal effect 
through the SUTVA assumption, by a direct comparison between the 
average results of the two treatment groups, in which units are similar, with 
respect to a ny possible characteristics, including potential results, thanks to 
randomisation. In an observational field
1, however, such direct comparisons 
may be misleading because the units exposed to one treatment generally 
differ systematically from the units exposed to the other treatment. 
Specifically, whereas in experimental situations one can obtain a control and 
treatment group which are homogeneous with respect to the observable 
characteristics,  X, this is not possible in nonexperimental studies since it is 
likely that the decision to be assigned to a treatment is, in this case, not 
independent from the observable as well as unobservable characteristics
2. 
This leads to a  self-selection process which makes the two groups 
potentially different even before the policy is carried out. A possible way to 
address this complication in nonexperimental studies is to consider the 
randomized experiment as a template for the analysis of an observational 
(i.e., nonrandomized) study. Having the template of a randomized 
experiment means having to think about the underlying randomized 
experiment that could have been done, where in the randomized experiment 
underlying an observational study, the probabilities of assignment to 
                                                 
1 A study is considered observational when a  treatment assignment is not known.  
2 With random assignment, homogeneity of the control and treatment group with respect to 
the unobservable characteristics is also guaranteed if the size of the groups is sufficiently 
large. 
   8
treatments are not equal, but are rather functions of t he covariates, and so 
the template is actually an unconfounded assignment mechanism. 
To do this we make the strong ignorability or unconfoundedness 
assumption. 
Assumption 1.2  Strong Unconfoundedness assumption 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) 
Generally, we shall say treatment assignment is strongly ignorable 
given a vector of covariates X if 
  X Z Y Y ^ ) 1 ( ), 0 (  and  1 ) 1 ( 0 < = < X Z prob  (common support) 
referring, from now on, to  ) 1 ( ), 0 ( Y Y  instead of  ) 1 ( ), 0 ( i i Y Y  for the potential 
results corresponding to the  i.th individual. For brevity, when treatment 
assignment is strongly ignorable given the observed covariates  X, we shall 
say simply that treatment assignment is strongly ignorable. The strong 
ignorability assumption asserts that the probability of assignment to a 
treatment does not depend on the potential outcomes conditional on 
observed covariates. In other words, within subpopulations defined by 
values of the covariates, we have random assignment. This assumption rules 
out the  role of the unobservable variables. The issue of unobserved 
covariates should be addressed using models for sensitivity analysis (e.g., 
Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983b) or using non parametric bounds for 
treatment effects (Manski, 1990; Manski et al., 1992). 
Of course, if the goal is to identify only the Average Treatment Effect for 
the Treated (ATT), a weaker assumption can be made:   9
Assumption 1.3  Weak Unconfoundedness assumption (Rosenbaum 
and Rubin, 1983) 
  X Z Y ^ ) 0 (  and  1 ) 1 ( < = X Z prob    
That is, the unconfoundedness assumption can be relaxed, requiring 
only that  Y(0) is independent of Z given X. Also the overlap 
condition can be relaxed so that the support of X for the treated units 
is a subset of the support of X for the untreated units 
Both the unconfoundedness assumption and the overlap condition, may be 
controversial in applications. The first assumption requires that all variables 
that affect both outcome and the likelihood of receiving the treatment are 
observed or that all the others are perfectly collinear with the observed ones. 
Although this assumption is not testable, it is a very strong assumption, and 
one that need not generally be applicable. Clearly selection may also take 
place on the basis of unobservable characteristics. However, any alternative 
assumptions that not rely on unconfoundedness, while allowing for 
consistent estimation of the causal effects of interest, must make alternative 
untestable assumptions. Whereas the unconfoundedness assumption implies 
that the best matches are units that differ only in their treatment status, but 
otherwise are identical, alternative assumptions implicitly match units that 
differ in the pre-treatment characteristics. Often such assumptions are even 
more difficult to justify. For instance, the technique of instrumental 
variables is sometimes considered as an alternative to assuming 
unconfoundedness (Heckman, 1979; Heckman and Hotz, 1989), but a 
disadvantage of these methodologies is the high sensitiveness with respect 
to the distributional hypothesis. A possible solution to this is a non or semi-  10
parametric approach through the selection of instrumental variables (Angrist 
et al., 1996). But, since the identification of these variables is often 
extremely difficult, the use of unconfoundedness assumption therefore may 
be a natural starting point after comparing average outcomes for treated and 
control units to adjust for observable pretreatment differences. 
 
The  strong ignorability assumption validates the comparison of treated and 
control units with the same value of covariates; in fact the average treatment 
effect (ATE) can be written as: 
)] 0 ( ) 1 ( [ Y Y E - = t   )] ) 0 ( ) 1 ( ( [ X Y Y E E - =  
    )] , 0 ) 0 ( ( [ )] , 1 ) 1 ( ( [ x X Z Y E E x X Z Y E E = = - = = =  
    )] , 0 ( [ )] , 1 ( [ x X Z Y E E x X Z Y E E = = - = = =  
while the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) formula may be 
rewritten as follows:  
]] , 1 ) 0 ( ) 1 ( [ [ 1 x X Z Y Y E E Z x T = = - = = t  
      ]] , 1 ) 0 ( [ [ ]] , 1 ) 1 ( [ [ 1 1 x X Z Y E E x X Z Y E E Z x Z x = = - = = = = =  
      ]] , 0 [ [ ]] , 1 [ [ 1 1 x X Z Y E E x X Z Y E E Z x Z x = = - = = = = =  
Note that in both  t  and  T t , due to the  unconfoundedness, what is not 
known:    11
]] , 0 ) 1 ( [ [ x X Z Y E E = =   and   ]] , 1 ) 0 ( [ [ x X Z Y E E = =  for t , 
]] , 1 ) 0 ( [ [ 1 x X Z Y E E Z x = = =  for  T t  
can be substituted with what can be actually observed: 
]] , 1 [ [ x X Z Y E E = =   and   ]] , 0 [ [ x X Z Y E E = =  for t , 
]] , 0 [ [ 1 x X Z Y E E Z x = = =  for  T t  
Typically, there are many background characteristics that need to be 
controlled for estimating the average causal effect and adjusting the 
estimation for all these covariates can be actually unfeasible. Propensity 
score technology, introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983a), addresses 
this situation by reducing the entire collection of background characteristics 
to a single “composite” characteristic that appropriately summarizes the 
collection. In the f ollowing sections, we will focus on common variants of 
such method.  
1.4  Propensity score: definition and properties  
Theoretically if the unconfoundedness assumption is valid, the expression 
for the propensity score can be rewritten as follows:  
) ( )) 1 ( ), 0 ( , ( X e Y Y X e =    12
Formally the unit  propensity score is the conditional probability that a unit 
be assigned to treatment given pre-treatment variables: 
) 1 ( ) ( x X Z p X e = = =  
 The propensity score is a balancing score, that is, where propensity score is 
equal, distribution of covariates is the same for treatment and controls, 
formally we can write (Rosenbaum and Rubin,1983): 
Lemma 1.1  Balancing of pre-treatment variables given the 
propensity score 
) (X e Z X ^  
In particular, the propensity score is the coarsest balancing score, i.e., any 
balancing score  b(X) must satisfy the relation  e(X) = f (b(X)), for some 
function  f (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983a).  The key feature of propensity 
score methodology is that, given the strong ignorability  assumption, 
treatment assignment and the potential outcomes are independent: 
) ( ) 1 ( ), 0 ( X e Z Y Y ^  
and 
1 )) ( 1 ( 0 < = < X e Z p  
Thus, adjusting for the propensity score removes the b ias associated with 
differences in the observed covariates in the treated and control group. As a   13
result, given the  strong ignorability assumption, if the propensity score e(X) 
is known, it follows that: 
[ ] ) 0 ( ) 1 ( ( Y Y E - = t  
   
)] ( , 0 ) 0 ( ( [ )] ( , 1 ) 1 ( ( [ )] ( ) 0 ( ) 1 ( ( [ X e Z Y E E X e Z Y E E X e Y Y E E = - = = - =
 
and 
)]] ( , 1 ) 0 ( ) 1 ( [ [ 1 X e Z Y Y E E Z x T = - = = t  
      )]] ( , 0 ) 0 ( [ [ )]] ( , 1 ) 1 ( [ [ 1 1 X e Z Y E E X e Z Y E E Z x Z x = - = = = =  
where the outer expectation is over the distribution of e(X). 
1.5 Matching and propensity score based methods 
In what  follows we will concentrate on the estimation of ATTs, although 
the techniques can be easily modified and used for the estimation of ATE. 
As already mentioned, the quantity  
]] , 0 [ [ 1 x X Z Y E E Z x = = =  
which by the uncounfoundedness assumption is used to estimate the 
unknown quantity   14
]] , 1 ) 0 ( [ [ 1 x X Z Y E E Z x = = =  
may be computed using different procedures. The most appropriate way 
would be to use the information about the untreated units, considering 
eventual differences in terms of observable characteristics between the two 
sub-populations of treated and untreated individuals. The most common  
methodologies in use are the regression and matching techniques. The first 
ones are based on the specification of a model for the outcome variable, for 
example the simple linear regression or more complex models. However, it 
is clear that correct specification of the model is crucial for correct causal 
interpretation. On the contrary, matching techniques do not need any a priori 
functional form specification between the dependent and independent 
variables and, in this sense, they are more robust  (Rubin, 1973a). We will 
now describe the most common variants of matching, that, as already 
mentioned, can be used together with the propensity score. 
1.5.1 Matching types 
A wide range of literature about matching procedure is available  (see for 
example Rubin, 1973a, b, Abadie and Imbens, 2004). These methods match 
each treated unit/s to control unit/s according to different procedures. In 
general, we may suppose to have a dataset concerning a population/sample 
of N units. For each of the N units we observe ( Yi
obs, Z i, X i) that, 
respectively, represent the observed potential outcome, the treatment 
indicator and the vector of the  k covariates. Because ATT is our causal 
estimand,  Yi(1) is observed for every treated unit, whereas  Yi(0), the   15
counterfactual outcome, must be somehow estimated. Matching allows to 
find, in the control group, a value for Yi(0) identified on the basis of the Xi 
pre-treatment variables. We can define by  T0  the untreated unit group, with 
z(j) the weight given to the unit  j and with  Ai = {j˛ T 0:  Xj ˛ C(Xi)} the 
subgroup of the untreated units, which  have are used to estimate  Yi(0), 
following criteria C(Xi).  
By defining every type of matching with  Ai  and Z i, we obtain  the following 
definitions: 
 
i)    Exact matching: 
Control  unit/s with the same observed characteristics of the treated 
units are sought out: 
Ai = {j˛ T0: (Xi = Xj)} 
The  greatest problem concerning this type of matching is given by 
the possibility that in the control group there is no unit with this type 
of characteristic. The probability of such an event happening 
increases with the number of covariates, if covariates are continuous 
variables and if the sample is not too large.  
 
ii)    Caliper matching: 
This type of matching is a generalization of exact matching. Instead 
of requiring a perfect equality of the covariates, the (treated and 
untreated) units characteristics  are assumed to be “not too distant”. 
This may be formalized as follows: 
Ai = {j˛ T0: ‰Xi
(m) - Xj
(m) ‰< c(m), m=1,i…,k)}   16
In this case the problem is choosing the threshold  c(m) for each 
covariate.  
 
iii)   Nearest neighbors: 
This type of method allows us to overcome the multidimensionality 
problem. In fact, according to this procedure, we may consider 
suitable metrics to reduce the distance between covariates. An 
appropriate solution is to choose the unit/s which are nearest, through 
an appropriate distance function: 
Ai = { j˛ T0 : minj j i X X - } 
In this case matching type would depend on the chosen metrics, for 
example the euclid distance, Mahalanobis distance (Rubin,1980a), 
variance covariance matrix (Abadie and Imbens, 2002,…etc. 
Another solution could be to include in A i  more than one unit, 
varying appropriately the weights zij in the estimator. 
1.6   Use of  propensity score in matching techniques and 
matching estimators 
Matching methods, applied in connection to propensity scores, remove the 
covariates multidimensionality problem. As previously mentioned, one of 
the most important propensity score property is, in fact, to be one-
dimensional summary of multidimensional covariates  X, such that when the 
propensity scores are balanced across the treatment and control groups, the   17
distribution of all the covariates  X are balanced in expectation across the 
two groups. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that for a specific value 
of the propensity score, the difference between the treatment and control 
means for all units with that value of the propensity score is an unbiased 
estimate of the average treatment effect at that propensity score, if the 
treatment assignment is strongly ignorable given the covariates. Thus 
matching or regression (covariance) adjustment on propensity score tends to 
produce unbiased estimates of the treatment effects when treatment 
assignment is strongly ignorable. Here the basic matching techniques 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984, Dehejia and Wahba, 1999) and estimation 
based on the propensity score methods presented. 
 
i)    Stratification matching 
According to this method,  the propensity score is divided in blocks 
so that in each layer the covariates are balanced and the assignment 
to treatment can be considered random. Once the stratification 
responding to such properties is obtained, treatment effect estimation 
is carried out through two steps. First, within each interval, we 
compute the difference between the means of the observed potential 
outcomes for treated and untreated units (obtaining a conditional 
effect estimation for that block. Second, we estimate the ATT effect 
weighting each difference according to treated units distribution 
inside each block (see Stratification matching estimator formula 
1.6.1 section).  
 
ii)    Nearest neighbor matching   18
This matching procedure matches to each treated unit that specific 
untreated unit that has the nearest propensity score:  
Ai = { j˛ T0 : minj ) ( ) ( j i X e X e - }   with  1 = ￿
˛ i A j
ij z  
The control group is represented by just one c ontrol unit and the 
selection is usually made with repetition, so it is possible to match it 
several times to various treated units. As a result, the number of 
control units, used for the intervention effect estimation, may be 
lower than the number of treated units. According to this method, it 
is possible to match some treated units to control units with a very 
different propensity score, in that it is the nearest among those 
singled out. As a result, a minimal distance between the two 
propensity scores needs to be set up. The group A i may be 
considered, however, suitably redefined so as to include more than 
one neighbour for each treated (number to be defined beforehand).  
 
iii)   Radius matching 
Each treated unit is matched to control units with a propensity score 
interval which is minor or equal to a certain “radius”  d and the 
number of controls to be used for the Y i(0) identification is not 
defined: 
Ai = { j˛ T0: e(Xi) - d £  e(Xj) £ e(Xi) +  d}   with  1 = ￿
˛ i A j
ij z    19
This procedure, compared to the previous one, has two basic 
differences: some treated units may be rejected because there is no 
untreated unit with a propensity score within the defined interval, 
more than one untreated unit can be matched to a single treated unit, 
as there are more untreated units with a propensity score includes in 
the interval. The choice of range  d has been made as a compromise 
between two existing requirements. In fact,  if the range is very 
small, some treated units will be missed, but making comparison 
between “very similar units” will be an advantage; vice versa a wide 
range will mean a higher  number of controls, but these will be “less 
similar” to the treated units 
 
iv)   Kernel matching 
Each treated unit is “matched” to all untreated units (Ai. = T 0), with 
weights varying inversely to the distance of their propensity score 








3 is a density function and h is the bandwidth parameter.  
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1.6.1 Matching Estimators 
We list the formulas for the matching estimators introduced in the previous 
section and their variance:   
Nearest Neighbor and radius matching 
The average effect on the treated, applying the nearest neighbor or 
radius matching method, is equal to the following formula (where n 
stands for either nearest neighbor or radius matching and the number 
of units in the treated group is denoted by N
T ): 



















with  1 = ￿
˛ i A j
ij z  
The variance estimator is assumed to have fixed weights and 
indipendent outcomes accross units:  
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where  T0 denotes the selected control sub-group applying the 
matching procedure  ￿ =
i ij j z z . S tandard errors are obtained 
analytically using the above formula, or using the bootstrap method, 
even if  this last point appears to be controversial for nearest neighbor 
matching, since standard errors seem to be inconsistent according to 
this procedure (Imbens, 2004). 
 
Stratification matching: 
By construction, the propensity score is divided in blocks so that in 
each layer the covariates are  balanced and the assignment to 
treatment can be considered random. As a result, the difference 
between the means of the observed potential outcomes for treated 
and untreated units, is equal to: 
0 1








Y ￿ ￿ ˛ ˛ - = t  
where 
1
q N  and 
0
q N  denote the number of treated and control units 
inside each block q. The estimator of the ATT is computed weighting 
each differences 
s
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where  Q is the number of layers and  NT  is the total treated units. 
Assuming independence of outcomes across units, the variance 
s t  is 
computed by:  
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Standard errors are obtained analytically using the above formula, or 
using the bootstrap method. 
Kernel matching: 
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where  ij z  is computed by the formula: 
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In this case standard errors are easy to obtain using bootstrap method.  
1.7  Alternative estimation methods  
Alternatives to matching methodologies are outlined in this paragraph. We 
will focused on the Difference in Difference and Heckman selection model.   23
DID methods for estimating causal effect of policy interventions are widely 
used in economics, in particular when  outcomes are measured in both the 
treatment and control group before and after the policy intervention.  In the 
standard DID model we have  N individuals (usually random sample from 
the population), observed in time periods   i T = (t-m),…(t-1),(t),(t+1)…(t+k), 
with  (t-m),…(t-1)  and (t+1)…(t+k) denoting the pre and post  - policy 
intervention period, respectively, while the error terms i e are assumed to be 
additive and constant over time. To account for time trends unrelated to the 
treatment, the change experienced by the group subject to the intervention 
(treatment group) is adjusted by the change experienced by the no-
beneficiary group (control group). Meyer (1995), Angrist and Krueger 
(2000), Blundell and MaCurdy (2000) describe many applications of this 
methodology. In the field of  Program Evaluation,  the  difference in 
difference method (Moffit, 1991; Heckman and Robb, 1985) involves the 
use of  panel data to better define the control group and reduce the selection 
bias effect. A great number of observational units: Yi,t-1, Y i,t-2, Y i,t-3… Y i,t-m, - 
before programme intervention at time ( t)  - can be (potentially) considered 
in the model. This means that we can highlight existing  systematic 
differences between the treated and untreated groups. Taking into account 
these differences allows us to obtain unbiased treatment effect estimation, 
since they could influence the outcome value independently to the program. 
It  is important to underline that a greater number of observations, before 
program treatment, that take into consideration the differences related to the 
temporal trends before policy actuation, certainly improving the estimate of 
the unobservable conterfactual measure.   24
Note that, the interpretation of the standard DID estimator depends on the 
assumptions about treatment effect with respect to the individuals. It is, in 
fact, often assumed to be constant across individuals, but more generally the 
effect of the intervention might differ across individuals, then the standard 
DID estimator gives the average intervention effect on the treatment group. 
Recently Imbens and Athey (2005) proposed a different approach from the 
standard DID method. They allow the effects of both time and intervention 
differ systematically across individuals (e.g, we can think about  new 
medical technology that differentially benefits sicker patients). The setting 
considered in their research is that of  repeated cross-sections
4 of individuals 
observed in a treatment group and a control group, before and after the 
treatment. They propose an estimator for the entire counterfactual treatment 
effect distribution on the treatment group as well as the treatment effects 
distribution on the control  group, where the two distributions may differ 
from each other in arbitrary ways. First they propose a new model that 
relates outcomes to an individuals’ group, time and unobservable 
characteristics.  Groups can differ in arbitrary ways (and, in particular,  the 
treatment group might have individuals who experience a high treatment 
benefit).  In DID method the mean of individual outcomes in the absence of 
the treatment can vary by group and by time.  In contrast, in their model, 
time periods and groups are treated asymmetrically.  Second, they provide 
conditions to identify the model in a non parametric way, proposing an 
estimation strategy based on the identification method. They use the entire 
control group outcome distributions pre and post intervention to make a non 
parametric estimation of the change occurred on the group. Assuming that 
the outcomes distribution in the treatment group would be the same (that is, 
                                                 
4 But they apply their model also to panel data.   25
with the same change),  they estimate the counterfactual distribution for the 
treatment group in the second period. They compare this counterfactual 
distribution to the actual post-intervention distribution for the treatment 
group, yielding an estimate of the treatment effects distribution for treated 
units. Using a similar strategy  they define the treatment effect on the 
control units.  In other words, to figure out what would have happened to a 
treated unit in the first period with outcome Y, they look at units in the first 
period control group with the same outcome Y. Under  weak monotonicity 
assumption, the distribution of their second period outcomes is possible to 
be derived, using that to obtain the counterfactual distribution for the second 
period treated units with no policy intervention. 
In this way it is possible to evaluate a range of economic  questions 
suggested by policy analysis, such as, for example, which part of the 
distribution benefits most from a policy intervention, always basing on a 
consistent economic model of the outcomes. The proposed CIC model has 
many advantages. It allows the d istribution of unobservable characteristics 
to vary across groups in arbitrary ways. It allows for changes of the 
distribution outcomes, both in mean and variance, over time and without a 
policy intervention. Moreover, it is possible to estimate the effects of a 
policy on the mean and variance of the treatment groups distribution relative 
to the original time trend in these moments. It is clear that the DID model is 
assumed to be a special case of the change in change model. 
One common worry (Besley and Case, 2000) is that the effects identified by 
DID may not be correct if the policy occurred in a “ field” that derives 
atypical benefits from the policy intervention. It implies that the treatment 
group may differ from the control group not just in terms of the outcomes 
distribution in the absence of the treatment, but also in the effects of the   26
treatment. Athey and Imbens’ model allows for both of these eventualities 
across groups, because they allow the effect of the treatment to vary by 
unobservable characteristics of an individual and the unobservable 
distribution varies across groups. 
 
Another model that is usually used to remove the hypothesis of selection on 
observable (unconfoundedness assumptions) is the Heckman selection 
model (Heckman, 1974) which can be specified in its simplest form as 
follows: 
i i i i Z X Y 1 2 1 0 e b b b + + + =   
i i i X Z 2 1 0
* e g g + + =  
that is, the model includes latent dependent variables models.  i Y  is the 
outcome and 
*
i Z  is latent variable underlying  the treatment indicator Z. X is 
a matrix ((N1 + N0)·h) with h equal to the number of characteristics constant 
over time, for the  i.th  unit, before policy intervention. The errors 
components 1 e , 2 e  are assumed to be j ointly bivariate normally distributed 
conditional on X, with zero mean vector and variance matrixS , so that: 
) , 0 ( 1 S » N e ,  ) , 0 ( 2 S » N e   
with  r e e = ) , ( 2 1 corr  
It is possible to remove the bivariate normality assumption of the errors in 
the following cases: maintaining the monotonicity assumption with the   27
availability of an instrumental variable (semiparametric Heckman’s 
selection models, Deaton(1989), Hausman and Newey (1995)) or, if an 
instrumental variable is not available, introducing non parametric bounds 
(Lee, 2005). However, most of the recent studies, aimed to develop 
semiparametric versions of selection models (Newey and Vella, 2003), 
while keeping some of the previous assumptions: Powell (1987), Newey 
(1988), Ahn and Powell (1993) and Honore and Powell (2001).  
   28
2  Multivalued treatment 
2.1  Introduction 
The Rubin causal model is usually presented for binary treatments, although 
in principle, in many cases of interest, the treatment takes on more than two 
values. There are many examples of that: we can think about drug applied in 
different doses or a treatment applied over different time periods, as well as 
labour market programmes that need a more complex framework including 
the actual choice set of individuals, certainly characterized by more than 
two options. Anyway, in all these cases, the standard propensity score 
methodology must be modified in a non-trivial way. As a consequence, 
methods have been developed in order to extend the conventional two 
treatments framework to allow for estimation of average c ausal effects with 
multiple mutually exclusive treatments. Imbens (1999) and Lechner (2000) 
gave, with this respect, the major methodological contributions. They refine 
identification using strong and weak unconfoundedness assumptions for the 
case of more  than two treatments. In the following sections we present and 
compare both approaches. 
2.2  The basic framework. 
In order to extend propensity score application from binary treatment to 
arbitrary treatment regimes, we report the basic assumptions available in the 
first case that we can usefully generalize also in multiple treatment. Let’s   29
summarize the conventional Rubin Causal Model. We have a binary 
treatment, that is Zi { } 1 , 0 ˛
1. Associated with each unit i = 1,2…N  and each 
value of the treatment z, there is a potential outcome Yi(z). We are interested 
in the average outcome, E[Y(z)] and particularly in the average causal effect 
of exposing units to treatment or not: E[Yi(1)  - Y i(0)]. A key assumption, 
that we will now restate for the identification of causal effect is the 
uncounfoundedness assumption in its two strong and weak forms. 
Assumption 2.1   Strong unconfoundedness assumption 
Assignment to treatment Z is strongly ignorable, given pretreatment 
variable X, if 
{ } { } X Z z Y z ^ ˛ 1 , 0 ) (  
In order to redefine 
 the weaker version of unconfoundedness, we define D i(z) to be the 














) (  
As a result, weak unconfoundedness assumption is defined in the following 
way: 
Assumption 2.2  Weak unconfoundedness assumption 
                                                 
1 See assumptions in previous section: Potential outcomes.   30
Assignment to treatment Z is weakly ignorable, given pretreatment 
variable X, if 
X z D z Y ) ( ) ( ^  for all Zi  { } 1 , 0 ˛ . 
As we can see, Rosenbaum and Rubin show how strong unconfoundedness 
requires the treatment Z to be independent of the entire set of potential 
outcomes, while weak unconfoundedness implies only pairwise 
independence of the treament indicator with each of the potential outcomes. 
Moreover, weak unconfoundedness requires a  local independence  of the 
potential outcome  Y(z) with respect to the considered treatment level. This 
means independence of the level indicator  ) (z D , rather than of the entire 
vector of treatment values Z. In the binary treatment case, first and second 
condition are obviously the same thing. It is clear that the importance of the 
two ignorability assumptions versions is strictly related to what we are 
interested in estimating. Particularly, the  weak unconfoundedness concept is 
linked to the missing data problem of causal inference. More often the 
concern is, infact, with the average of  Yi(z) in the sub-sample with 
1 ) ( = z Di . As a consequence, units with  0 ) ( = z Di  did not receive treatment 
level  z and the other potential outcomes  Yi(0)  are never observed for the 
units with  1 ) ( = z Di , so that they can play no role in any adjustment for 
differences procedures by defining subpopulations. This lack of relevance is 
well reflected by  weakly ignorable assumption. In addition we report the 
following Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.2. 
 
Let be  ) (X e  the propensity score in binary treatment case, we have:   31
Lemma 2.1 Balancing property of pre-treatment variables given the 
propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983)  
) (X e X Z ^   
Lemma 2.2 Weak unconfoundedness given the propensity score with 
binary treatments (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) 
) ( ) ( ) ( X e z D z Y ^   for all Zi  { } 1 , 0 ˛  
According to this result, it is sufficient to condition on the propensity score 
instead of the entire set of covariates (Imbens,1999). Formally, we also 
report the following Theorem that will be useful in section 2.4, in order to 
introduce the average treatment effect estimation in multivalued treatment 
case. 
Theorem  2.1  Adjustment for propensity score given weak 
unconfoundedness assumption: 
i)  ] ) ( , ) ( [ ] ) ( ) ( [ ) , ( e X e z Z z Y E e X e z Y E e z = = = = ” m  
ii)  ))] ( , ( [ [ )] ( [ X e z E E z Y E m =  for all Zi  { } 1 , 0 ˛ . 
2.3  Multiple treatment 
From now on, we allow the treatment variable to take on integer values 
between 0 and k. Let T  be the treatment variable in the multi-valued case, 
so that  { } k T ,.... 1 , 0 =  and  Xi the set of covariates such that  c ˛ X . It is   32
assumed that each individual  i = 1,2…N   is assigned to one specific 
treatment.  
We are interested in the population average treatment effect and, 
particularly, in the average causal effect of exposing units to treatment t or 
to treatment s, that is: 
)] ( ) ( [ s Y t Y E ATEts - =  
which denotes the ATE of the treatment  t relative to treatment  s for a 
participant drawn randomly from the population. The average effect of 
treatment t relative to treatment s, for the sub-population having received 
treatment level t only, can be defined as follows: 
] ) ( ) ( [ t T s Y t Y E ATTts = - =  
Imbens and Lechner refer to different versions of unconfoundedness 
assumptions according to the  type of treatment effect that is needed 
to identify and estimate. The following  weak ignorability 
assumptions can be introduced: 
Assumption 2.3  Weak unconfoundedness given pre-treatment 
variables X (version 1) (Imbens 1999) 
X t D t Y ) ( ) ( ^   T t˛ "
    
Assumption 2.4  Weak ignorable assumption (version 2) 
X s D t D s Y ) ( ), ( ) ( ^    33
Assumption 2.5  Strong ignorability assumption (Lechner, 2000) 
x X T s Y t Y = ^ ) ( ), (   
Assumption 2.6 Weak  ignorability assumption (Lechner, 2000) 
{ } t s T x X T s Y , , ) ( ˛ = ^  
Synthetically we report the average treatment effects that can be identified 
under each of the previous assumptions: 
)] ( ) ( [ s Y t Y E ATEts - =    
according to the assumption 2.3 and assumption 2.5 
] 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( [ = - = t D s Y t Y E ATTts  
according to the assumption 2.4 and   assumption 2.6 
Again, there are many background characteristics that need to be controlled 
for estimating the average causal effect and adjusting the estimation for all 
these covariates can be unfeasible. In this sense, t he introduction of a 
Propensity score  generalized to arbitrary treatment regimes results very 
useful s ince the propensity score summarizes the information on the 
background characteristics in an appropriate single summary score. As a 
consequence, we need to modify the standard definition of propensity score, 
to allow for the implementation of a generalized propensity score (Imbens, 
1999): 
Definition 2.1  Generalized propensity score   34
The Generalized propensity score (GPS) is the conditional 
probability of receiving a particular level of the treatment given the 
pre-treatment variables: 
] ) ( [ ) Pr( ) , ( x X t D E x X t T x t r = = = = ”  
According to this notation, the propensity score in the binary treatment is 
equivalent to: 
) , 1 ( ) ( x r x e =  
Hence,  i) the GPS defines a single random variable as a transformation of 
the two random variables  T and X: r(T,X); ii) it defines a family of random 
variables indexed by t as a transformation of X  alone: r(t,X) for all  T ˛ t . 
The GPS also satisfies the balancing property, like the conventional 
propensity score: 
Lemma 2.3  Balancing property of the Generalized Propensity 
Score 
) , ( ) ( X t r X t D ^    for all  T t˛ .  
Proof (Imbens, 1999) 
First we have 
) , ( ] ) ( [ )] , ( , 1 ) ( Pr[ X t r X t D E X t r X t D = = =  
in fact by definition    35
] ) ( [ ) , ( X t D E X t r =  
Second  
] , ( )] , ( , ) ( [ [ )] , ( ) ( [ )] , ( 1 ) ( Pr[ X t r X t r X t D E E X t r t D E X t r t D = = =  
Hence  
)] , ( 1 ) ( Pr[( )] , ( , 1 ) ( Pr[ X t r t D X t r X t D = = = ,  
that is, conditionally on  r(t,X), the treatment indicator D(t) and the pre-
treatment variables are independent. It is important to note that the 
conditioning argument changes according to the level of treatment. As a 
result, to guarantee conditional independence of the multi-valued treatment 
T and covariates X, we need to condition on the entire set of 
T ˛ t X t r )} , ( { . It 
is only in the binary treatment case that conditioning on 
T
˛ t X t r )} , ( {  is 
identical to conditioning on a single score  e(X). As a result, all previous 
unconfoundedness assumptions can be re-written given the generalized 
propensity score definition. In  fact, if strong or weak ignorability 
assumptions given the covariates are available, then: 
Theorem 2.2 Weak unconfoundedness given GPS  (Imbens, 1999) 
Suppose assignment to treatment T is weakly unconfounded given 
pre-treatment variables X (version 1), then: 
) , ( ) ( ) ( X t r t D t Y ^   T t˛ "  
Proof   36
)] , ( ), ( ) ( [ )] , ( ), ( 1 ) ( Pr[( X t r t Y t D E X t r t Y t D = =  
)] , ( ), ( )] , ( , ), ( ) ( [ [ X t r t Y X t r X t Y t D E E =  
) , ( )] , ( , ), ( ) , ( [ X t r X t r X t Y X t r E = =  
Moreover, as shown in the proof for Lemma 2.3,  
           ) , ( )] , ( 1 ) ( Pr[ X t r X t r t D = = .  
Hence,  
)] , ( 1 ) ( Pr[ )] , ( ), ( 1 ) ( Pr[ X t r t D X t r t Y t D = = = ,  
so, conditionally on r(t,X), D(t) and Y(t) are independent. 
Assumption 2.7 Weak unconfoundedness given GPS (version 2) 
) , ( ), , ( ) ( ), ( ) ( X s r X t r s D t D s Y ^   
According to Lechner’s approach we can re-write the previous assumptions 
3 and 4, given the pre-treatment variables, in the following way: 
Assumption 2.8    Strong unconfoundedness given GPS  (Lechner, 
2000) 
If   x X T s Y t Y = ^ ) ( ), (   and  1 ) Pr( 0 < = = < x X j T  hold for 
c ˛ "x and for  k s t j ,.... , ... 1 , 0 = " ,  
It follows  that    37
)] Pr( ) Pr( ),..., Pr(
) Pr( ), Pr( ) [Pr( ) ( ), (
x X k T X k T x X s T
X s T x X t T X t T T s Y t Y
= = = = = = =
= = = = = ^
 
Assumption 2.9  Weak unconfoundedness given GPS   (Lechner, 
2000) 
If  { } t s T x X T s Y , , ) ( ˛ = ^   and  1 ) Pr( 0 < = = < x X j T  hold for 
c ˛ "x  and  s t j , = "  
 It follows that   
{ }] , ), ( Pr ) ( [Pr ) ( ), (
, , s t T x X T s Y t Y
s t s s t s ˛ = ^   
where 
{ }
) Pr( ) Pr(
) Pr(
) , , Pr(
x X t T x X s T
x X s T
x X s t T s T
= = + = =
= =
= = ˛ =
 . 
2.4  Implementation of the GPS in multi-valued treatments. 
Since the GPS has analogous properties to the propensity score used in 
binary treatment, we now apply it instead of the covariates, in order to 
obtain the  ATEts  and  ATTts estimations. In the binary treatment case, the 
propensity score is computed using a logistic regression. In the multi-valued 
case could be applied multinomial logit or nested logit models (with ordered 
levels of treatments in the second case, for example the dose of a drug or 
time over w hich a treatment is applied, …etc). Given the generalized 
propensity score, we can compute the average outcomes estimation by   38
conditioning solely on the GPS. As a result, according to Theorem 2.2 and 
imposing  smoothness of the expectation function if appropriate, the 
conditional expectation of the outcome can be estimated (Imbens, 1999), 
given the treatment  t and the probability of receiving the treatment actually 
received, applying the following Theorem: 
Theorem 2.3 Estimation of Average Potential Outcomes given the 
generalized propensity score, supposing assignment to treatment 
weakly unconfounded given the pre-treatment variables. 
Then 
i)  ] ) , ( , [ ] ) , ( ) ( [ ) , ( r X T r t T Y E r X t r t Y E r t = = = = = b  
ii)  ))] , ( , ( [ )] ( [ X t r t E t Y E b =    by iterated expectations 
for all  T t˛ . 
Proof 
The proof concerns part i), since part ii) follows by applying iterated 
expectations 
] ) , ( , ) ( [ ] ) , ( , [ r X T r t T t Y E r X T r t T Y E = = = = =  
] ) , ( , 1 ) ( ) ( [ ] ) , ( , [ r X t r t D t Y E r X t r t T Y E = = = = =  
which by weak unconfoundedness assumption is equal to 
] ) , ( [ r X t r Y E =    39
Note that to obtain the population average value (which, as we will show in 
the continuous case, is the  causal effect estimation) we need to apply 
iterated expectations on  ) , ( r t b , i.e  ))] , ( , ( [ )] ( [ X t r t E t Y E b = . We can 
consider the subpopulations obtained as strata of the population applying the 
GPS. In particular, let  Y(t) be the average value for units with treatments t 
and  r(T,X) = r , this is an unbiased estimate of the average  Y(t) for the 
subpopulation with  T = t  and  r(t,X) = r . The reason is that the former 
subpopulation with  r(T,X) = r is the same as the latter one with  r(t,X) = r. 
As a result, the average of  Y(s) for units with  T = s , in the same 
subpopulation with  r(T,X) = r , is unbiased for the average of  Y(s)  in a 
different subpopulation with  r(s,X) = r  (that is,  with a different set from 
subpopulation with r(t,X) = r ). Hence no causal comparison can be possible 
within the subpopulation defined by  r(T,X) = r  and the regression of the 
observed Y on the treatment level  T and the GPS r(T,X) = r has no causal 
interpretation. 
Formally consider the difference 
] ) , ( , ) ( [ ] ) , ( , ) ( [ ) , ( ) , ( r X T r s T s Y E r X T r t T t Y E r s r t = = - = = = - b b
 
by weak ignorability assumption (version 1) this is equal to 
] ) , ( ) ( [ ] ) , ( ) ( [ r X s r s Y E r X t r t Y E = - =  
but there is no causal interpretation for the comparison conditional on the 
GPS value, because the conditioning sets differ: 
{ } { } r x s r x r x t r x = „ = ) , ( ) , (    40
In order to obtain a causal interpretation, we need to condition the difference 
to the intersection of the two conditioning sets, that is: 
)] , ( ), , ( , ) ( [ )] , ( ), , ( , ) ( [ X s r X t r s T s Y E X s r X t r t T t Y E = - =  
)] , ( ), , ( ) ( ) ( [ X s r X t r s Y t Y E -  
But, if the researcher is interested in t he dose-response of a specific sub-
population or in the average effect of a specific treatment versus another 
one, the average should be computed over the distribution of the pre-
treatment variables in that particular sub-population. For example, we can 
estimate the expected (average) effect of treatment  t relative to treatment  s 
for the sub-population having received treatment level  t  only. In particular, 
according to the weak unconfoundedness (version 2), the  ts ATT is supposed 
to be equal to: 
] 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( [ = - = t D s Y t Y E ATTts  
] 1 ) ( ) ( [ ] 1 ) ( ) ( [ = - = = t D s Y E t D t Y E  
]] , 1 ) ( ) ( [ [ ]] , 1 ) ( ) ( [ [ X t D s Y E E X t D t Y E E = - = =  
that by weak unconfoundedness is equal to: 
]] , 1 ) ( ) ( [ [ ]] , 1 ) ( ) ( [ [ 1 ) ( 1 ) ( X s D s Y E E X t D t Y E E t D X t D X = - = = =  
and given the generalized propensity score, we can rewrite it as follows:   41
]] ) , ( ) ( [ [ ]] ) , ( ) ( [ [ 1 ) ( ) , ( 1 ) ( ) , ( r X s r s Y E E r X t r t Y E E t D x s r t D x t r = - = = =  
where the outer expectation is over the treated units having received 
treatment level  t. Remember that, since the treatment can take on more than 
two values, it is important to be sure that there is sufficient  overlap in the 
distribution of pre-treatment variables by treatment of interest. The 
procedure is to compare for each value of  t the univariate distribution 
) , ( X t r conditional on  T = t with the same distribution with T „ t. If the two 
distributions are similar, then all adjustment methods can be well 
performed. Of course, other types of procedures can be applied in order to 
obtain the average treatment effects estimation. For example, we can use 
matching techniques, assuming that each individual is assigned to one 
specific treatment and that, for any participants, only one component of 
T
˛ t t Y )} ( { can be observed, while the remaining outcomes represents the 
counterfactuals units. We introduce a pairwise comparison of the treatments 
t and s according to the following equations (Lechner, 2000): 
)] ( [ )] ( [ )] ( ) ( [ s Y E t Y E s Y t Y E ATEts - = - =  
that denotes the ATE of the treatment  t relative to treatment  s for a 
participant drawn randomly from the population. 
Note that ATEts can be re-written in the following way: 
) ( )] ) ( ( ) ) ( ( [ )] ( ) ( [
1
j T P j T s Y E j T t Y E s Y t Y E ATE
K
j
ts = = - = = - = ￿
=
 
The strong unconfoundedness condition identifies all counterfactuals:   42
) ) ( ( j T t Y E = and  ) ) ( ( j T s Y E = , because it implies 
) , ) ( ( ) , ) ( ( t T x X t Y E j T x X t Y E = = = = =  and 
) , ) ( ( ) , ) ( ( s T x X s Y E j T x X s Y E = = = = = , k j ,.. 1 , 0 = " . 
 As a result,  st ATE ,  ts ATE   ts ATT ,  st ATT , are identified. 
The expected effect for an individual randomly drawn from the population 
of participants in treatment t only is, instead, equal to: 
) ) ( ( ) ) ( ( ] ) ( ) ( [ t T s Y E t T t Y E t T s Y t Y E ATTts = - = = = - =
2 
The  weak unconfoundedness condition identifies only the counterfactual 
) ) ( ( t T s Y E =  that is needed to compute the  ATTts. Note that this last 
assumption is derived from the independence and assignment in population 
that implies independence in any subpopulation defined by treatment 
participation categories.  
However, a stronger ignorability assumption of treatment assignment (with 
respect to assumption 2.5) can be also adopted for arbitrary treatment 
regimes, in order to model  T without conditioning on potential outcomes 
(Van Dik and I mai, 2003). We postpone a discussion on the generalization 
of the propensity score, under strong ignorability  assumption, in the 
continuous treatment case, also comparing Van Dik’s approach (2003) with 
respect to Hirano and Imbens’ elaboration (2004) of the propensity score 
method applied for the treatment effect estimation. 
                                                 
2 It is evident that, if the participants in treatments t and s differ in a non-random way, this 
can influence the outcome values: ATTts „ ATTst, that is to say they are not symmetric.   43
3  Continuous treatment 
3.1  Introduction 
We showed how, under specific assumptions, like the  strong ignorability 
treatment assignment, multivariate adjustment methods based on the 
propensity score have the property of reducing the bias that arises in 
observational studies. 
In this project we implement an extension of the propensity score method in 
a setting with a continuous treatment, that is we refer to the generalized 
propensity score already introduced in multiple treatment case. We make an 
unconfoundedness assumption (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) and adjust for 
the Generalized Propensity Score (function of the covariates) to remove all 
bias associated with differences in the covariates. The Generalized 
Propensity score is just a generalization of the binary treatment propensity 
score (Imbens and Hirano, 2004; Van Dik and Imai, 2003), with many of its 
characteristics and balancing property which are essential to assess the right 
specification of the score.  We proceed to the estimation and inference of 
the c ausal effects of interest in a parametric way (even if a non parametric 
version is possible). We apply this methodology to the public contributions 
(treatment variable) supplied to the Piedmont enterprises, during years 2001 
- 2003 . Due,  infact, to the variety of funds set by public policies, the 
treatment turns out to be a  continuous variable. We are interested in the 
effect of the amount of contribution on occupational level.  
We estimate the average effect of the contribution adjusting for the 
difference in background characteristics using the propensity score   44
methodology and compare the results to conventional regression based 
methods. According to the empirical evidence (Dehejia and Wahba  1999; 
Imai  2004) the former methodology often leads to more robust results than 
the latter one or other estimation methods, such as DIDor selection model 
presented in section 1.7. 
3.2  Framework 
We consider a sample of units i=1,2,…,N and, for each unit, we have a set 
of potential  unit-level outcomes Yi(t) for t˛ t. In  the binary treatment t  = 
{0,1}, but in the continuous case we have t ￿ [t0,t1]. We are interested in the 
average dose-response function  m(t)=E[Yi(t)], in correspondence with the 
observed vector of covariates  Xi    and the level of the assigned treatment  t  
[i.e Yi = Yi(t)]. 
We assume  {Y(t)}t˛t  , T, X  defined in a common probability space,  T 
continuously distributed with respect to Lebesgue measure on  t  and  Y = 
Y(T) a well-defined random variable; i.e Y(.) suitable measurable. 
We are interested in the estimation of average causal effects, which can be 
computed through the  dose-response function  m(t)  and in particular in the 
ATE and ATT, such as: 
] [ Y(t) t) Y(t E ATE?t,t - + = ?  
] [ t Y(t) t) Y(t E ATT?t,t - + = ?    45
that is, in the continuous treatment case we can be interested in  marginal 
treatment effect estimation, for example with respect to a specific treatment 
level  t. Imbens and Hirano (2004) generalize the  uncounfoundness 
assumption available for binary treatment (Rosembaum and Rubin 1983) to 
the continuous case and crucial for the estimation of the above quantities. 
Assumption 3.1  Strong ignorability assumption of treatment 
assignment (Van Dyk and Imai, 2003)  
{ } X T t Y t ^ ˛t ) (  
Assumption 3.2   Weak unconfoundedness assumption  (Imbens and 
Hirano, 2004) 
Y(t) ^ T|X for all t ˛ t. 
Assumption 3.2 requires a  conditional independence for each value of 
treatment  t  ˛  [t0,t1] and not joint independence of all potential outcomes 
{ } t ˛ t t Y ) ( .  
As already underlined, there are many characteristics that need to be 
controlled for the average treatment effect estimation. The introduction of a 
generalized propensity score  reduces the entire collection of background 
characteristics to a single “composite” variable that appropriately 
summarizes them. Here the GPS definition: 
Definition 3.1  Generalized Propensity Score 
 Let  r(t,x)  be the conditional density function of the treatment given 
the covariates   46
r(t,x) = fT|X (t|x) 
such that R(T,X) and r(t,X), for every t ˛ t, are well-defined random 
variables. 
The conditional distribution  fT|X(t|x) must be modeled and its unknown 
parameters must be estimated using, for example, maximum likelihood 
method
1. Misspecification of the model for the propensity score is possible 
and generally leads to biased causal inference estimation. Hence, care must 
be taken to identify as many covariates as possible, as well as to check for 
model misspecification (Drake, 1993). The generalized propensity score can 
be also defined through a propensity function: 
) , ( ) ( ) ( X T r x t f X T y y =  
where its distribution is assumed to be parameterized by  y  (Van Dik and 
Imai, 2003). Under these analytical framework, it is possible to derive 
theoretical results which extend those in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983b). 
Dik and Imai (2003) show the propensity score is a balancing score even 
with a non binary treatment, so that it could be applied to arbitrary treatment 
regimes, also reducing the dimensionality of  X enough to allow for the 
application of efficient estimation techniques. Formally we have: 
Lemma 3.1  Balancing of pre-treatment variables given the 
generalized propensity score (Van Dyk and Imai, 2003) 
                                                 
1 We can think to the  normal  distribution for the  treatment given the covariates 
) ), ; ( (
2 s b i i i X h N X T ~  where b is the parameter vector,  ) , ( b i X h  is a known function of the 
covariates which depends on the parameters b  to estimate and s
2 is the unknown common 
variance of the errors.   47
Within strata with the same value of r(t,X) , the probability that T = t 
does not depend on the value of X: 
X ^ 1{T=t}| r(t,X) 
This definition does not require unconfoundedness.  
The following theorem establishes that the potential outcomes and the 
treatment assignment are conditionally independent given the generalized 
propensity score. Formally we write: 
Theorem 3.1  Strong unconfoundedness given the Generalized 
Propensity Score (Van Dyk and Imai, 2003) 
)) (., } ) ( ({ )) (., , } ) ( ({ X r t Y f X r T t Y f t t t t ˛ ˛ =  
Proof (Van Dyk and Imai, 2003) 
Theorem 3.2  Weak unconfoundedness given the Generalized 
Propensity Score (Van Dyk and Imai, 2003) 
If assignment to the treatment is (weakly) unconfounded  given the 
pre-treatment variables X, then: 
fT (t| r(t,X), Y(t)) = fT (t|r(t,X))    for each value of t.  
Proof (Van Dyk and Imai, 2003) 
In other words, if the balancing hypothesis of  Lemma 3.1 is satisfied, 
observation with the same GPS must have the same distribution of 
observable characteristics, independently of treatment’s value. So, just like   48
for the standard propensity score, exposure to treatment is random and 
treated and control units should be on average identical. Hence, having the 
generalized propensity score equivalent properties to the propensity score 
for binary treatment, it can be applied, instead of covariates, as one 
dimensional score summarizing the information on the background 
characteristics, so leading to more efficient average treatment effect 
estimations. The difference, here, is that the conditional density of the 
treatment level at  t corresponds to the evaluation of generalized propensity 
score at the same  t: this implies as many propensity scores as levels of 
treatment to use each at one time. In particular, using GPS in connection to 
smoothing techniques we have: 
Theorem 3.3  Bias removal with Generalized Propensity Score 
(Imbens and Hirano, 2004). 
Suppose that the assumptions of Theorem 3.3 are satisfied, then: 
B(t,r)=E[Y(t) | r(t,X) = r] = E[Y | T = t, R = r]= B(t,r) 
m(t) = E [B(t,r(t,X)]= E [E[Y(t)  |  r(t,X)  ]]=E[Y(t)]     (by iterated 
expectations) 
Theorem 3.3  implies that, in order to estimate the  dose-response function 
u(t), First, we must estimate the conditional expectation of the outcome, E[Y 
| T = t, R = r], is estimated  as a function of a specific level of the treatment 
T = t and of a specific value of GPS  R = r . Second, the  dose-response 
function,  m(t) = E [B(t,r(t,X)],  is estimated averaging the  conditional 
expectation over the score r(t,X), evaluated at a certain level of the treatment 
t. As already underlined, it should be clear that B(t,r) does not have a causal   49
interpretation. We, infact, need to average  the conditional expectation over 
the marginal distribution  r(t,X),  E[E[Y(t)  | r(t,X)  ]],  to estimate the  causal 
effect. 
Proof of Theorem 3.3 (Imbens and Hirano, 2004): 
Let  ) , ( ) , ( , ) ( r t y f X t r T t y  represent the conditional density of  Y(t) given  T = t 
and r(t,X) = r. Then applying the Bayes rule and Theorem 1 we get: 
) ) , ( (
) ( ) ) , ( , ) ( (
) , (
) , ( ) (
) , ( , ) ( r X t r t f
r y f r X t r y t Y t f
r t y f
T
X t r t Y T
X t r T t y =
= =
=  
     =  ) ( ) , ( ) ( r y f X t r t Y  
So we can write 
] ) , ( ) ( [ ] ) , ( , ) ( [ r X t r t Y E r X t r t T t Y E = = = =  
but also we have 
       ] ) , ( , ) ( [ ] , ) ( [ r X T r t T t Y E r R t T t Y E = = = = =  
] ) , ( , ) ( [ r X t r t T t Y E = = =  
) , ( ] ) , ( ) ( [ r t r X t r t Y E b = = =  
Hence  ) , ( ] ) , ( ) ( [ r t r X t r t Y E i i b = =  that is part (i) of Theorem 3. Then we 
have  ). ( )] ( [ )]] , ( ) ( [ [ ] ) , ( , ( [ t t Y E X t r t Y E E r X t r t E m b = = = =    50
Moreover, supposing to be interested in  marginal treatment effect 
estimation with respect to treatment level t, we can write: 
)] ( [ )] ( [ )] ( ) ( [ , t Y E t t Y E t Y t t Y E ATE t t - + = - + = ? ? ?  
that denotes the ATE of the treatment  ) ( t t D + relative to treatment (t) for a 
participant drawn randomly from the population  N. Another quantity of 
primary interest is represented by the treatment effect estimation ATT, in a 
specific sub-population: 
] ) ( [ ] ) ( [ ] ) ( ) ( [ , t t Y E t t t Y E t t Y t t Y E ATT t t - + = - + = ? ? ?  
]] , ) ( [ [ ]] , ) ( [ [ X t T t Y E E X t T t t Y E E t T X t T X = - = + = = = ?  
that, by weak unconfoundedness, is equal to: 
)]] , ( ) ( [ [ )]] , ( ) ( [ [ ) , ( ) , ( X t r t Y E E X t t T r t t Y E E t T X t r t T X t t r = = + - + = + ? ? ?  
The t t ATT , D denotes the expected effect for an individual randomly drawn 
from the population of participants having treatment level  t, while  r(t,X) is 
measurable with respect to the sigma-algebra generated by X. 
Imbens’ procedure (2004) for the dose-response estimation  - according to 
the previous assumptions and Theorems – is based on the regression on the 
propensity score technique. We will apply an extension of it since it 
represents a valid strategy if implemented in empirical study. A method of 
using the propensity score is to estimate the conditional expectation of  Y 
given  T and  r(t,X). First the GPS is estimated through the conditional   51
distribution of the treatment variable given the covariates,  assuming a 
specific functional form, for example a normal linear model
2: 
) ), ; ( (
2 s b i i i X h N X T ~  
or  
) ), ; ( ( log
2 s b i i i X h N X T ~  
with the estimated GPS equal to: 
) ; ( i i X T gps f =
￿
 
To verify whether this specification is suitable, we investigate how it affects 
the  balance of the covariates. Hence, we first divide the range of the 
treatment in an arbitrary number of intervals, we then define further blocks 
of the GPS, for a specific ) ; ( i X t r =  - computed at a certain treatment level. 
Then, we examine the balancing for each covariate, testing whether the 
mean in one of the treatment groups is different from the other treatment 
groups combined, inside each GPS block . We make this for each treatment 
interval with respect to the others groups, computing the  t-tests for each 
covariate and treatment interval. However, the precise steps of the GPS 
implementation will be shown in the next chapter, in our empirical case 
study. After having specified and estimated the GPS, we need to model the 
conditional  expectation of the outcome on the treatment variable and the 
                                                 
2 We may use more general models such as mixture of normals or heteroskedastic normal 
distributions, with the variance considered as a parametric function of the covariates.   52
score, E[Y  | T = t, R = r] , as a flexible function of its two arguments
3. For 
example, we can use a linear regression or a quadratic approximation, such 
as:  




0 1 0 ] , [ b b b b b b + + + + + =  
We estimate  the parameters of the model , e.g by ordinary least squares, 
using the estimated GPS  i R ˆ  among the regressors. Hence, we estimate the 
average potential outcome at treatment level  t: 
￿
)] ( [ t Y E , doing this for each 
level of  the treatment we are interested in, to get an estimate of the entire 
dose-response function
4.   
t X t r X t r X t r t t t Y E
N
i
i i i ￿
=
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿






0 1 0 ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ] ) ( [ b b b b b b  
In the last step we need to average the estimated regress function over the 
score function in correspondence of the desired level of  t.  Rather than 
referring to the dose-response function, we can report its derivatives. In 
economics, this represents the  marginal propensity (Imbens and Hirano, 
2004) with respect to what we are interested in estimating. As we will show 
in our observational study, this will be a useful and an alternative strategy to 
estimate the dose  – response, allowing for computing estimates at a specific 
treatment level as well as comparing the  marginal propensities at different 
levels of intervention. 
                                                 
3 Remember that there is no causal interpretation for the conditional expectation of the 
outcome. 
4 It is convenient to use bootstrap methods to compute standard errors and form confidence 
intervals.   53
3.3  The sub-classification procedure 
The GPS can be used also with sub-classification and matching procedure, 
although they are usually more cumbersome than in the binary treatment 
case.  Van Dik and Imai (2003) implement analysis techniques mostly based 
on sub-classification  and able to balance a high-dimensional covariate 
adjusting for a low-dimensional propensity score. In sub-classification 
technique, first they model the conditional distribution of the treatment 
given the covariates  ) ( x t f
X T y ,  where  y  parameterises the distribution. 
Second they compute 
￿
y  of  y  that represents the parameters estimation. As 
a result, the parametric model defines the generalized propensity score as 





  . Third they compute  ) , ( X t r
￿
￿
y for each observation and 
sub-classify observations with the same or similar values of  
￿
r into a number 
of sub-classes of equal size. Within each sub-class they model the outcome 
distribution given the treatment  ) , ( ) , ( , ) (
￿
r t y f X t r T t y , e.g by regressing Y(t) on 
both  t and 
￿
r . To further reduce the bias Robins and Rotnitzky (2001) have 
suggested the inclusion of other covariates in the regression. The average 
causal effect can be computed as a weighted average of the within sub-
classes effects, with weights equal to the relative size of the sub-classes. 
Formally the average treatment effect can be approximated in the following 
way: 
                                                 
5 We can think to the Gaussian density function:  ) ), ; ( (
2 s b i i i X h N X T ~ , where  ) , (
2 s b y =  








= »￿  
where S is the number of sub-classes and  s W  is the relative size of each sub-
classes, estimated by the proportion of observations included into sub-class 
s. Since results may be sensitive to the number of subclasses and sub-classes 
choice, Van Dick and Imai (2003) suggest to conduct a sensitivity analysis 
with different types of sub-classifications. 
3.3.1  Lu’s matching technique applying the GPS 
In contrast to sub-classification  method, Lu et  al. (2001) suggest matching 
pairs of units on 
￿
r . In order to implement this procedure, in the continuous 
treatment case, we need to divide the range of the treatment variable in 
blocks, applying matching inside each strata, so proceeding in the average 
treatment effect estimation. However, in this context, matching procedure 
turns out to be more difficult to apply than in binary treatment. This because 
the matched pairs should not only have similar 
￿
r , but they should also have 
different treatment levels (this is not a problem in the binary treatment case 
since each pairs is a unit from the treatment group and a unit from the 
control group).  Lu  et al. (2001) propose a distance measure that decreases 
when the propensity scores become similar and the received treatments 
become dissimilar. The treatment effect can be evaluated by examining the 
difference in response between the “high” and “low” treatment and, in order 
to take into account the difference in treatment, they also suggest to regress 
the difference in  response on difference in treatment. It is evident the   55
difficult application of these techniques for a generalization to continuous 
treatment variables. In this sense sub-classification ad smoothing techniques 
represent more powerful strategies, since they allow a simpler 
implementation of more complex causal effect analysis.  
 
4  Conclusion 
 
Propensity score methods have become one of the most important tools for 
analyzing causal effects in observational studies. Although the original work 
of Rosenbaum and  Rubin (1983) considered applications with binary 
treatments, it can also be extended to multivalued and continuous 
treatments. We have discussed some of the issues involved in handling 
multiple and  continuous treatments and emphasized how the propensity 
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